An important question that Þrms face in advertising is developing effective media strategy. Given the fragmentation of media (broadcast TV for example) and a multitude of new advertising media (the Internet, satellite shopping channels, and infomercials), Þrms have the ability to target advertising to speciÞc segments of consumers in a market. But the existing research on advertising does not analyze the targeting of advertising.
Introduction
Advertising is the area where marketing managers have ultimate decision-making authority and media purchasing is far and away the largest element of advertising spending. An important challenge in advertising planning is the efficient use of the advertising dollar and ensuring that the advertising spending is correctly targeted to consumers that are relevant to the product. Nowhere is this more the case than in the selection and planning of media vehicles in order to achieve optimal deployment of advertising.
1 Traditionally, the objective in media planning has been to reduce wasted advertising by reducing the extent to which advertising reaches consumers who are not users of a product category. However, increasingly Þrms are also concerned about targeting advertising to speciÞc consumer segments within a product category. Firms' concern about wastage of advertising and the need to better target is relevant in today's markets given both the fragmentation of existing media (broadcast TV for example) and the multitude of new advertising media (the Internet, satellite shopping channels, and infomercials). Table 1 below indicates how fragmented media spending has become. Better information technology, detailed consumer information and the availability of sophisticated media buying have also increased the ability of Þrms to target speciÞc segments of the market (see "Star Turn," The Economist, March 9, 2000). Despite the importance of this activity, there seems to be a lack of research that analyzes the targeting of advertising and its effect on markets and the competitive strategies of Þrms. The reality of advertising and media planning is one where companies attempt to focus advertising to speciÞc consumers. Consider the U.S. light beer market in which Miller Lite and Coors Light are major competitors. The light beer market comprises of distinct demographic groups which vary in their consumption proÞle. Miller Lite, the "diet beer" has traditionally been directed to the mature male beer drinker who is becoming concerned about his waistline (in their mid to late thirties). In contrast, Coors Light has been more popular among young and relatively newer beer drinkers (men and women in their early 20's). But, a substantial proportion of light beer consumption resides in the intermediate segment comprised of young adults in their late twenties to early thirties. These consumers are less committed in their brand preferences.
2 Clearly, an important question for Þrms is the decision about how to allocate media budgets between the segment in which they have strong franchise and the segment of uncommitted consumers who choose between competing brands. This question becomes more important with improvements in the ability of Þrms to target advertising media.
Intuition would suggest that concentrating advertising on consumers who have a strong preference for a Þrm's product can be advantageous because this results in guaranteed sales and higher prices. However, it is consumers who are undecided between the products who are more likely to be attracted away by competition and so it can be argued that a Þrm should direct more advertising resources to these consumers. Will competition for consumers who have more ßexible preferences lead to higher advertising being directed towards these consumers? This paper provides an analysis of this trade-off in a model of competition between differentiated Þrms. We model Þrms competing with targeted advertising and examine how the ability to focus advertising on speciÞc groups of consumers affects market competition and the choice of advertising and prices.
The following questions are analyzed in the paper: When Þrms have the ability to target different levels (media weights) of advertising to different consumer segments, how will they choose these media weights? Should a Þrm advertise more to consumers who have a strong predisposition for its product or to consumers who are more likely to switch to a competing product? How are equilibrium pricing and proÞts in a market affected by Þrms' ability to focus their advertising? We also examine how the ability to focus advertising affects the overall level of advertising used by
Þrms. Recent advances in consumer information and database technologies also mean that Þrms can price discriminate and offer different prices to different groups of consumers. We examine how the ability to target advertising interacts with targeted pricing.
The model of the paper analyzes advertising and price competition between Þrms. Advertising has the role of informing consumers of relevant product information which is necessary for considering the product. Each Þrm has a group of consumers who have a distinct preference for its product in the sense that they would only consider buying from that Þrm up to a reservation price. There is also a group of consumers who compare the prices at both Þrms and buy at the lowest price.
Advertising is costly and the cost of informing a group of consumers is directly proportional to the size of that group. In this framework, the targeting of advertising implies that Þrms can design media vehicles to focus advertising messages to particular segments of the market. A Þrm that is unable to target advertising, advertises uniformly to the entire market.
We show that when Þrms have the ability to target advertising, they will advertise more to the segment that has a strong preference for their product than to the segment of consumers who comparison shop between the Þrms. When Þrms reduce advertising to the comparison shoppers, they do not compete for these consumers all the time. Advertising less to the price elastic consumers who shop around is a strategic method of creating additional market differentiation, thereby reducing price competition. The targeting of advertising also provides the direct beneÞt of eliminating "wasted" advertising to consumers who prefer to buy the competing product. For these reasons, the ability to target advertising increases the equilibrium proÞts of Þrms.
The total advertising spending of Þrms can either increase or decrease with targeting. When advertising is expensive, the inability to target advertising leads Þrms to choose low levels of advertising. While this means less wasted advertising, Þrms are not able to realize the full demand potential because fewer consumers are reached. In this case targeting helps Þrms realize higher demand. In contrast, when advertising is inexpensive, then a Þrm chooses high advertising levels with uniform advertising. This implies that the extent of wastage is signiÞcant and the ability to focus advertising leads to lower advertising expenditures.
We also analyze how the ability to target advertising interacts with targeted pricing. An important suggestion of our analysis is that in a competitive environment, the ability to target advertising is more important for increasing proÞtability than the ability to target pricing. When Þrms have the ability to choose different advertising levels for different groups of consumers, it leads to higher proÞts independent of whether or not Þrms also have the ability to set targeted prices. In contrast, the beneÞt of targeted prices is nulliÞed by the increased competition for the comparison shoppers.
Consequently there is no improvement in equilibrium proÞts.
We also extend the model to the case of continuous advertising where a Þrm can choose to reach any proportion of the market and show that the insights discussed above hold for this case. We also provide an empirical application of the theory to local advertising in retail markets. Butters (1977) examines the role of advertising in providing information about the existence of products and their characteristics (and prices). Grossman and Shapiro (1984) extend this to a market with horizontal differentiation and analyze the impact of informative advertising on market competition and the provision of variety. Soberman (2001) also analyzes a similar model to understand effect of advertising on prices. There is also research that views the quantity of advertising as a signal of quality when buyers cannot identify the quality of products before buying (see for example Nelson 1974 , Klein and Leffler 1981 and Milgrom and Roberts 1986 .
Related Research
There is no theoretical research that examines the ability of Þrms to focus or target advertising to speciÞc segments of consumers in a market. In the literature, directed marketing activity has been analyzed in context of other marketing elements. Price discrimination based on past consumerbehavior (past purchases) has been examined by Villas-Boas (1999 ) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) . Previous research has also examined targeted coupon promotions (Shaffer and Zhang 1995) , location-speciÞc pricing (Chen and Iyer 2002 and Thisse and Vives 1988) , and the impact of directed product changes (Iyer and Soberman 2000) . This paper contributes to this research by analyzing the market impact of the targeting of informative advertising. In the following section, we present the basic model that we use for the analysis. The next section presents the main results of our analysis. We then present several extensions to the model and an empirical application to local advertising in retail markets that illustrates the main ideas of the paper.
The Model
We develop a model of a market with two Þrms i = 1, 2. Each Þrm produces its product at a constant marginal cost of production which is assumed to be zero without loss of generality. We start by describing the consumer market.
The Consumer Market
The market is comprised of a unit mass of consumers. Each consumer has a demand of at most one unit of the product. Consumers have a common reservation price r for the product. Assume that each Þrm has a segment of consumers who have high preference for its product in the sense that they consider buying only from the Þrm as long as the price at this Þrm is below the reservation price r.
The proportion of these consumers per Þrm is given by h. The remaining consumers are comparison shoppers who are indifferent between the Þrms and would buy the product with the lower price (as long as this price is below the reservation price). The size of this segment s is given by s = 1 − 2h.
Note that h represents the extent of ex-ante market differentiation, with higher values representing greater differentiation between the Þrms. When h = 0, all consumers comparison shop between the two Þrms and the competition between the Þrms reduces to Bertrand price competition.
Consumer Information Structure
We model the role of advertising in conveying relevant product information to consumers. The consumer information structure used is similar to Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) .
Consumers may know the structure of the product market in terms of the presence of different products, but they might not know which product has exactly the characteristics that they prefer.
An advertisement that reaches a consumer provides the consumer with information on the relevant attributes/characteristics of the product. Without the advertising message, consumers do not have information about the existence of the product and will not consider it for purchase. One can think of advertising simply providing information to a consumer about which product has the attribute relevant for the consumer. Note that this simply implies that advertising facilitates consideration of the product by the consumer.
The characterization of advertising is consistent with behavioral research that has documented that advertising can make a product and its characteristics salient in consumer memory. This in turn enhances the likelihood that consumers consider the product if its characteristics do indeed match consumer tastes (see Mitra and Lynch 1995) . For new products, clearly awareness is the Þrst stage in creating demand for a product. Consumers also use advertising for new products to obtain information about key product features.
But the formulation is also consistent with the role advertising plays in mature product categories. Keeping a product "top-of-mind" and priming the consumer to consider it is critical in established categories such as beer and soft drinks wherein product features of the major brands are well-known. For example, in the soft drinks market, one might argue that the product features of Coke and Pepsi are known to most consumers. Yet these brands spend a signiÞcant amount of their budget in reminder advertising aimed at keeping the brand top-of-mind.
The Advertising Technology
Advertising messages are costly and the cost to advertise to the entire market is A. However, when advertising can be focused on particular segments in the market, we assume that the cost to advertise to each segment is related to its size. Therefore, if a Þrm is able to target advertising the relevant costs are Ah for the high preference consumer segment and As for the comparison shopping segment. Note that a Þrm does not have an incentive to target advertising to the segment of h consumers of its competitor, as they will not consider buying its product. We consider advertising that informs all of a given segment or none of it. In section 5.1 we show that the results obtained continue to hold when advertising is continuous and when Þrms can advertise to any proportion of the market.
Equilibrium Analysis of Advertising and Price Competition
Consider Þrst the base case when Þrms do not have the ability to focus advertising or pricing to particular segments of the market. This provides the base case which we use to interpret and understand the effect of the ability to focus advertising.
Uniform Advertising and Price Competition
Consider that in equilibrium both Þrms advertise. With uniform advertising, Þrms can reach the entire market for a cost A. The price equilibrium will then be in mixed strategies. The reasoning for this is as follows: Suppose that one Þrm, say Firm 2, chooses a price p 2 that is not too low, then Firm 1 would like to undercut p 2 in order to attract the comparison shoppers. Otherwise, Firm 1 will set prices at the reservation price in order to maximize the proÞt from its h consumers.
A similar reasoning applies to Firm 2's responses to Firm 1's choice of p 1 . Denote the c.d.f of the mixed strategy price distribution to be F i (p). In a symmetric equilibrium (F i (p) = F (p)), the proÞt of a Þrm when charging a price p in the mixed strategy proÞle will be given by:
From the invariance of proÞt condition of a mixed strategy equilibrium, the proÞt realized at every price must be equal. Using standard analysis as in Varian (1980) , the equilibrium proÞt is the guaranteed proÞt that a Þrm can realize by charging the reservation price and selling only to its h segment: π(r) = hr − A. The advertising equilibrium of this model can now be characterized beginning with the following lemma:
Lemma 1: When hr > A, firms advertise in equilibrium with probability one. When hr ≤ A, then the equilibrium will involve firms using mixed advertising strategies.
Firms will advertise 100% of the time if the guaranteed proÞts are large enough to cover the cost of advertising. This happens when the extent of differentiation (h) or the reservation price are large enough. The derivation of the price equilibrium for this case is similar to Varian (1980) or Narasimhan (1988) and is as follows:
Denote the probability of a charging a price above any given price p, H(p) = 1 − F (p). It can be seen that
> 0. Thus, as expected, the average price charged by a Þrm increases with the extent of differentiation between the Þrms (i.e. larger h).
The interesting case is the one in which Þrms do not Þnd it optimal in equilibrium to advertise with probability one. In other words, in less differentiated markets (or if the reservation price for the product is small compared to the cost of advertising), Þrms employ mixed strategies in advertising.
We can interpret the probability with which Þrms advertise as the frequency or the intensity of advertising within an advertising planning period. To derive the symmetric equilibrium for the case in which Þrms employ mixed strategies in advertising, deÞne α as the probability of advertising by a Þrm. From the property of a mixed strategy equilibrium the proÞts between advertising and not advertising should be equal which implies the following equilibrium condition:
This leads to the following Proposition:
Proposition 1: When hr ≤ A, and with uniform advertising, the equilibrium profits are zero and the equilibrium probability with which firms advertise is α
. In addition, firms employ mixed pricing strategies with c
The equilibrium probability (or frequency) of advertising decreases with the cost of advertising and increases with the reservation price. It is also easy to see that
Thus the expected price increases with both market differentiation (the size of the h segment) and advertising costs. The relationship between α * and market differentiation is more interesting: The frequency of advertising decreases with the size of the comparison shopping segment (i.e., lower
. However, advertising frequency increases in the size of the comparison shopping segment when A > r 2
. An increase in the advertising frequency creates two effects that govern Þrm competition.
An increase in α creates a competitive effect because it increases the set of comparison shoppers who are informed by the advertising of both Þrms. But increased advertising also provides a demand beneÞt by informing more of the high preference segment which only considers its favorite
Þrm. When costs of advertising are low (A < r 2
), Þrms advertise with higher frequency all else being equal. In this case, a reduction in market differentiation (increases in s) means that the reduction in proÞts from increased price competition will be greater than the positive impact on proÞts of informing more of the high preference consumers. In equilibrium, the strategic response of Þrms is to reduce the frequency of advertising to mitigate price competition. The opposite is true when advertising costs are sufficiently high (A > r 2
). In this case, the beneÞt of increased demand outweighs the competitive effect and Þrms respond by increasing the frequency of advertising.
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To sum up, when advertising media costs are low, Þrms will choose lower levels of advertising in more competitive markets. However, when the costs of advertising media are sufficiently high,
Þrms facing more competitive markets will choose higher levels of advertising. The reader will also note that informative advertising can help Þrms to endogenously create market differentiation. In other words, when markets become more competitive Þrms can respond by strategically choosing lower levels of advertising. This beneÞts Þrms, not only because it reduces the cost of advertising, but also because it reduces the set of consumers who comparison shop the two Þrms.
Competition with Targeted Advertising
We now analyze the main issue of the paper pertaining to media precision and the ability of Þrms to target advertising to particular segments of the market. The ability to target advertising has two valid interpretations for the purposes of this paper. It can imply the availability of more precise media vehicles which allow Þrms to better focus advertising on speciÞc segments of the market.
Alternatively targeting can also imply better information about consumer preferences that Þrms can use for deploying communication activities. The targeting technology in our model implies that Þrms can direct advertising to the high preference and the comparison shopper segments separately. Given our assumption that the cost of advertising is proportional to the consumers reached, we have that the cost of targeting the h segment only of a Þrm will be hA, while the cost of targeting advertising to the comparison shopping segment only will be sA.
Because Þrms can choose to advertise to the high preference consumers only and charge the reservation price, the guaranteed proÞts from the h segment will be h(r − A). Thus Þrms will always advertise to their h consumers as long as r > A. For the rest of the analysis we will assume that this holds. 4 Note that with the ability to focus advertising, Þrms will not advertise to the other Þrms' h consumers as these consumers will not buy from the Þrm. Next, consider advertising to the comparison shopping segment: in general, advertising to this segment will involve mixed advertising strategies. Suppose that both Þrms advertise with probability one. Then, if advertising is costly, either of the Þrms has an incentive to deviate by reducing the frequency of advertising by a small amount. While the Þrm's expected demand from the comparison shopping segment goes down by a small amount, this is offset by the two effects that have a positive impact on proÞts: the Þrm saves on the cost of advertising and also gets the strategic beneÞt of reduced price competition for the comparison shoppers. Therefore, advertising to the comparison shopping segment will be in mixed strategies. Writing the probability of advertising to comparison shoppers as β, the proÞt function for a Þrm, when advertising to s will be:
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium with targeted advertising.
Proposition 2: When advertising can be targeted, and r > A, the equilibrium profit is h(r − A)
and firms advertise to their h consumers with a probability one and to comparison shoppers with a probability of β
. In addition, firms employ mixed strategy pricing with c
, r].
The Þrst point to note is that the equilibrium probability of advertising to the comparison shoppers β * , is strictly less than one. This means that Þrms advertise more to the segment of consumers who have greater preference for their product than to comparison shoppers who choose between the two Þrms. This highlights the following general rationale: informative advertising to the consumers who have stronger preference for a Þrm's product allows the Þrm to extract consumer surplus. Therefore, the Þrm would always prefer to advertise to these consumers. Assume now that the Þrms always advertise to comparison shoppers who are undecided between the two products.
In this case, it is optimal for a Þrm to unilaterally reduce the level of advertising to the comparison shoppers who perceive no differentiation between the two Þrms. By doing so, the Þrm does not always compete with the other Þrm for these consumers. The competing Þrm enjoys monopoly power over these consumers when it is advertising but not the focal Þrm. The strategic effect of this is to reduce the intensity of price competition. Thus, advertising with probability less than one helps a Þrm to endogenously create differentiation between the Þrms in the competitive part of the market. Furthermore, the direct effect of focused advertising is that it eliminates the wastage caused by advertising that falls on the competitor's h segment. Consequently, as Proposition 2
shows that the ability to focus advertising to speciÞc segments leads to an increase in proÞt over the case of uniform advertising.
Note that the advertising intensity to the comparison shopping segment increases with the reservation price (because with higher r there is more surplus to extract from consumers who are reached by advertising) and decreasing in A. Targeted advertising also has some interesting effects on advertising spending, and on pricing. i.e., when advertising is relatively inexpensive. Given that the ability to focus advertising should increase the effectiveness of advertising, it is surprising that it can lead to a reduction in advertising expenditures.
To understand this, consider the situation faced by a Þrm that cannot focus its advertising. In this case the Þrm cannot control the wasted advertising that reaches the h customers of the other Þrm who will not buy. When advertising is inexpensive, a Þrm will choose high levels (i.e., frequency) of advertising, all else being equal. Therefore, without the ability to focus advertising, inexpensive advertising means that the extent of wastage is signiÞcant. The ability to target advertising allows the Þrm to eliminate this wastage leading to a decrease in the overall level of advertising expenditures. In contrast, when advertising is expensive, Þrms choose low levels of advertising under uniform advertising. While there is little wastage in this case, Þrms are not able to realize demand potential because fewer consumers are reached. In this case, the ability to target advertising allows Þrms to realize higher demand by increasing advertising to both a Þrm's own consumers and the comparison shoppers and this leads to an overall increase in advertising expenditures.
Targeted advertising also increases the average prices that Þrms charge. With targeted advertising a Þrm is always able to advertise to the h segment, while advertising with probability β to the comparison shopping segment. A consequence of this is reduced price competition between Þrms leading to higher average prices being charged in equilibrium.
To summarize, Propositions 2 and 3 highlight the effects of media precision and the ability to focus advertising. Firms advertise more to consumers who have a stronger preference for their products. In addition, Þrms are able to eliminate advertising to the competitor's h segment who would not buy its product. Therefore, targeted advertising increases the equilibrium proÞts. Targeted advertising also has interesting effects on advertising expenditures: When advertising is inexpensive, the ability to focus advertising leads to reduction of wasteful advertising. However, when advertising is expensive, targeting leads to greater spending on advertising.
The Value of Targeted Advertising
How much would Þrms in a competitive market be willing to pay for the ability to target advertising?
In other words, what is the incremental value of the ability to target advertising. Recall that in a world with uniform advertising, the equilibrium proÞt is π u = hr − A when A < hr and zero if A > hr. With targeted advertising the equilibrium proÞt is π ta = h(r − A). The value of advertising targeting V ta for Þrms in a competitive market is as follows:
When advertising is not very costly A < hr, the value of targeting decreases with market differentiation and actually increases with the cost of advertising. In this case, Þrms in the uniform advertising world would always advertise and this implies that a greater proportion of the advertising is wasted. The wastage increases with the cost of advertising and in more differentiated markets with greater h. With greater differentiation, the wastage effect under uniform advertising will be higher.
Therefore the value of targeting increases with the cost of advertising and in more competitive markets with smaller number of h consumers. In other words, when advertising is inexpensive, the beneÞt of targeting is primarily based on cost savings.
In contrast, when advertising is costly, (A > hr,) the value of advertising increases with market differentiation but decreases with the cost of advertising. When advertising is costly, Þrms in the no targeting world do not always advertise and price competition eliminates proÞts when they do.
With targeting, Þrms earn proÞt of h(r − A) i.e., targeting allows each Þrm to extract surplus from its high preference segment. Here, the value of targeting comes primarily from the increase in the revenue that it allows (as opposed to cost-based when A < hr). Thus, the value of targeting is positively related to both the extent of differentiation and the net margin on sales to the h consumers (r − A). 5 These Þndings suggest that the ability to target advertising is always valuable for competing Þrms. The main determinants of a Þrm's behavior will be the availability of media that can be targeted and the cost of learning about consumer preferences.
Comparing Advertising and Price Targeting
Until now we focused on markets where Þrms had the ability to target advertising but could only compete with uniform pricing strategies. This is of course the mainstream case of most products markets where Þrms can focus advertising to different consumer segments through the media plan, but where the product is sold to consumers through traditional retail channels. But with advances in information technology, the growth of the Internet and better point-of-sale technologies Þrms increasingly have the ability to price discriminate and target specialized prices to different segments. Therefore as in Lemma 1, if hr > A, then Þrms will advertise with probability one.
If hr < A then Þrms will employ mixed advertising strategies. Similar to section 3, we solve for a symmetric equilibrium and denote γ as the probability of advertising. We can write the proÞt of a Þrm when it advertises as:
The equilibrium proÞt in this case is zero, while the equilibrium probability of advertising is
. Comparing this with the case of uniform advertising and pricing, we can see that the incentive to advertise is unaffected by the ability to set targeted prices (the equilibrium advertising is identical to the case of uniform pricing derived in section 3). The equilibrium proÞts also do not change from the uniform price case. This is because while targeted pricing allows Þrms to increase the price charged to the high preference consumers (to the reservation price r), it also increases competition for the comparison shoppers relative to the base case. In equilibrium these effects cancel out and Þrms do not beneÞt from targeted pricing versus the base case. With targeted pricing, the comparison shoppers are better off while the high preference segment is not and pays the reservation price.
We now consider the case where Þrms can target both advertising and pricing. The importance of this case is apparent given the ability that direct marketers have to offer tailored prices to consumers and the increased availability of individual-level consumer information. Analyzing this problem helps us to understand how the ability to focus advertising would interact with a Þrm's ability to target pricing. When Þrms can target both price and advertising, each Þrm can guarantee itself a proÞt of a proÞt of h(r − A). This is because the Þrm can choose to send advertising only to their h segment and charge the reservation price. Similar to section 3.2, Þrms do not advertise to the h consumers of the competitor and employ a mixed advertising strategy to the comparison shopping segment. We can write the following equilibrium condition for the comparison shopping segment where γ t is the probability of advertising to comparison shoppers:
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium:
Proposition 5: When advertising and pricing can be targeted, the equilibrium profit is h(r − A)
and firms advertise to their h consumers with a probability one and to comparison shoppers with a probability of γ = 1 − A r
. In addition, firms will employ mixed pricing strategies with F (p) = 0 for
for p ∈ [A, r] and F (p) = 1 for p > r.
Neither the advertising strategy nor the proÞts of Þrms are affected when Þrms that can target advertising obtain the ability to target prices. Similar to section 3.2 where advertising can be targeted but prices are uniform, Þrms advertise to their h segment with probability of one and the probability of advertising to comparison shoppers is identical. The beneÞt of targeted pricing is the ability to charge reservation prices and extract surplus from the high preference segment. However, targeted pricing also increases price competition with comparison shoppers because a Þrm can now reduce price to these consumers without reducing the price to its h segment. These effects cancel out and the proÞts for Þrms are the same as the case with only targeted advertising.
Advertising versus Price Targeting
The targeting of advertising leads to increases in Þrm proÞts independent of whether Þrms are able to target pricing or not. In fact, the increase in proÞts due to targeted advertising over the base case is independent of whether Þrms target pricing or not. Furthermore, if the Þrms are not able to target advertising, the equilibrium proÞts remain the same independent of whether or not Þrms can target pricing. This adds an important perspective to the literature on targeting and competitive price discrimination. Several papers have pointed out that competitive price discrimination can lead to lower equilibrium proÞts compared to the case of uniform pricing. For example, Thisse and Vives (1988) show that when Þrms compete by offering location-based pricing, the equilibrium proÞts are even lower than the proÞts of the uniform-price competition case. Chen and Iyer (2002) analyze location-based pricing when Þrms have imperfect reach and also Þnd that proÞts drop below the uniform pricing case when the reach is sufficiently high. Winter (1997) and Corts (1998) show that (third-degree) price discrimination by imperfectly competitive Þrms leads to more intense competition and lower equilibrium proÞts compared to the case of uniform pricing. Similar to these papers, targeted pricing in our model is competitive third-degree price discrimination and consistent with the literature, it leads to no proÞt advantage for Þrms. When Þrms target pricing, they can price discriminate between their own segment and the comparison shopping segment. This implies that Þrms can set the reservation price for their high preference segment while competing for the consumers in the comparison shopping segment with a different targeted price. Targeting leads to increased price competition in the comparison shopping segment such that the gains in a Þrm's high preference segment are eliminated by reduced proÞts from the comparison shopping segment.
However, as we show targeted advertising always leads to increases in equilibrium proÞts. This underscores the importance of media planning techniques and databases to improve the targeting of advertising. Thus, a message of the analysis is that in a competitive environment, the ability to target advertising is likely to be more important for Þrm proÞts than the ability to target pricing.
Firms advertise more (i.e., more frequently) to consumers who have strong preference for their product than to comparison shoppers when advertising can be targeted. Advertising to consumers with strong preferences leads to a guaranteed sale, whereas whether a Þrm sells to a comparison shopper depends upon whether the consumer is reached by the other Þrm's advertising and also on the prices charged. Next, the targeting of advertising allows Þrms to increase the effectiveness of advertising activity. When advertising is inexpensive (A < r 2 ), targeting leads to lower advertising because advertising that falls on consumers who prefer the competitor's product is eliminated.
When advertising is expensive, it means being able to send higher advertising to consumers who will buy.
Empirical Illustration: Local Retail Advertising
Our analysis suggests that Þrms will beneÞt from targeted advertising. This implies that Þrms in competitive markets should utilize targeted as opposed to uniform advertising strategies when suitable media technology is available and when it is possible to cost-effectively learn about consumer preferences. In addition, given that Þrms have the ability to target, we would expect them to send higher weights of media to consumers that have a stronger pre-disposition to purchase their products. This phenomenon should be most prevalent in the case of retail advertising about store events and specials of which consumers would otherwise have no knowledge. Local advertising plans of retailers provide an interesting context to illustrate the ideas of this paper. We investigate the local advertising activity of hypermarchés in France
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Retail markets are suitable for our investigation because the distance that a consumer lives from a retailer and other demographic factors are likely to be strong indicators of consumer's preference to shop at a retailer. Second, given that the majority of local advertising for retailers is printed catalogues, ßyers and brochures; targeting speciÞc urban areas (and not others) is possible. Finally, the majority of local advertising by retailers is informative in nature and it informs consumers about the sales events and specials for different categories of goods at the retailer.
Our discussions with company representatives indicate that at least three of Þve large hypermarchés in France, develop their creative and promotional programmes for local advertising nationally but manage the deployment of media for local advertising at the store level (the media decisions are the quantity of printed items distributed by each store, and the addresses to which they are delivered). These retailers construct patronage maps in which the retail trading area for each store (in terms of the strength of their franchise) is divided into primary, secondary and tertiary territories. The hypermarchés use independent researchers to conduct in-store surveys (at the check out) and analyze of loyalty and credit card purchases. The retailer then uses the data to estimate its share of total hypermarché sales by urban area (in France, cities are divided into arrondissments and each village has its own city hall and postal district). The addresses of customers are matched to speciÞc shopping behavior reported in the survey.
A summary of the criteria used to determine the territories is shown in Table 4 . In general, the primary area for one hypermarché corresponds to a tertiary area for its competitors and vice versa. Based on several patronage maps, we show a representative map for an urban area in central France (Figure 1) . The patronage maps of each store is are annually updated to accommodate for changes in customer proÞles. Apparently, one of the difficult issues in constructing a patronage map is deciding how close to the competitor's store the border of the secondary territory should be drawn. To assist with this task, ISDM, a market research Þrm headquartered near Paris, estimates "zones de bascule" for retailers. Roughly translated, these can be thought of "zones of switchers".
ISDM divides the entire country into pockets of three hundred households and using a combination of survey data, driving distances and traffic density designates "zones de bascule" for participating retailers. A hypermarché marketing manager noted that the studies of ISDM are useful for Þne-tuning the patronage map. The map shows how the territories of the focal store are affected by the presence of a nearby competitor. Our interviews indicate that the presence of a nearby competitor tends to increase the size of the secondary zone and reduce the relative importance of primary and tertiary zones. Second, the primary zone of each hypermarché generally extends further on the side of the hypermarché that is furthest the competitor. This makes sense but it underlines the risk of depending solely on distance from the hypermarché as a basis for establishing patronage zones.
The second issue pertains to the media strategies employed by the retailers. French hypermarchés classify their printed advertising efforts based on the theme of the brochure, catalogue, or ßyer. Interestingly, the theme also plays a key role in determining the media strategy used by the hypermarché. The local advertising efforts are summarized in Table 5 . The table shows that the retailers send 100% of their advertising brochures to primary consumers, signiÞcantly less to secondary consumers, and less again to tertiary consumers. Advertising activity is therefore focused more on the retailer's core customers than on the consumers for whom the retailer competes intensely. In fact, the hypermarchés regularly purchase surveys of local advertising from two market research Þrms (Agena 3000 and Arbalète). These surveys show that the intensities of local advertising from direct competitors in urban districts tend to be negatively correlated. One interviewee suggested that the hypermarchés "cooperate" to limit the amount of junk mail sent to each household. Two further points are worth highlighting. While most of a hypermarché's core customers are found in primary areas, the hypermarché has no information on the majority of households in any given area (many of these households are not customers). The important point is that the territory and distance correlates highly with a household's pre-disposition to respond to the advertising events of the store. Second, while there are many regular product categories for which customers may shop at the hypermarché independent of the advertising, it is important to note that French hypermarchés are much bigger than regular supermarkets and a signiÞcant proportion of their sales come from consumer spending on discretionary products. Many of the themes used for local advertising promote items and products that are discretionary. Consumers might not consider these items at all were it not for the advertising. Furthermore, given both the size of the store and the distance that one must park from them, a shopping trip to a hypermarché is a time consuming undertaking. In this sense, the advertising plays the role of making consumers aware of purchase opportunities that they might otherwise not pursue. Thus advertising of sales and special events have an important role in informing and motivating consumers to consider shopping at the retailer.
Extensions

Continuous Advertising
In the base model, Þrms can choose between advertising that informs all of a given segment or none of it. Here we extend the analysis to a situation where Þrms can choose to advertise to any fraction φ of a segment between 0 and 1 (as in Grossman and Shapiro 1985) . For any given advertising intensity φ, if there is targeting, every consumer within the targeted segment sees the advertising with a probability of φ. The cost of advertising is proportional to the size of the segment and is increasing and convex (we use a quadratic cost function) in the fraction of the segment informed.
Because the strategy space for the Þrms includes mixed pricing strategies, advertising intensities can be a function of the pricing proÞle chosen by each Þrm. As a result, the cost function for advertising, when targeting is possible, is written as i.e. A = k 2 qφ 2 j (p) where j is the type of consumer, q is the size of the segment and p is the price. For the case of uniform advertising, this cost function
Uniform Advertising (Continuous Case)
We begin our analysis of continuous advertising, by considering a situation of uniform advertising and price competition. If both Þrms advertise in equilibrium, the price equilibrium will be in mixed strategies for the same reasons as in the base case. Given that the advertising intensity, may be a function of the pricing proÞle, we deÞne φ o (p o ) to be the advertising level chosen by the competitor that corresponds to his choice of price p o. The proÞt function for a Þrm can then be written as:
The full solution is provided in the Appendix. In this case Þrms use pure advertising strategies and the equilibrium level of advertising is φ = r(h+s) k+rs < 1 (when advertising is sufficiently expensive 2 . Finally, and similar to the discrete advertising analysis, the average price increases in the cost of advertising, the reservation price and the size of the high preference segment.
Targeted Advertising and Uniform Pricing (Continuous Case)
We now turn to the case where advertising is continuous and can be targeted to speciÞc segments.
As in the discrete case, when Þrms can target advertising, they will choose zero advertising to the competitor's h segment. For a given price p, deÞne φ h (p) to be the probability of advertising to own s and φ s (p) to be the probability of advertising to the comparison shoppers. Reasoning analogous to the uniform advertising case implies that the price equilibrium is one of mixed strategies 7 . Here we denote the advertising intensity of the competitor to comparison shoppers as φ o (p o ) when charging price p o and f (p o ) is the probability density function of the competitor's price.
The objective function for each Þrm is:
The full solution of this case is presented in the appendix. We present the following proposition that characterizes the advertising and pricing strategies:
1. The advertising strategies for both the high preference segment and the comparison shopping segment is in mixed strategies. In addition, the level of advertising to the high preference segment is strictly greater than the level of advertising to the comparison shopper segment and φ h (p) and φ s (p) are negatively correlated.
2. For the equilibrium pricing strategy described by F * (p) (i.e. for prices between p and r), price is positively correlated to the level of advertising for the high preference segment and negatively correlated to the level of advertising for comparison shoppers.
The equilibrium condition can be derived to be π =
The advertising level that Þrms choose is related to the price chosen. Therefore, advertising to both segments are in mixed strategies. However, we still recover the basic Þnding that Þrms advertise more to their own segment than to comparison shoppers. With targeting, not only are Þrms able to eliminate wasteful advertising to the other Þrm's h segment, they are also able to focus heavier weights on customers who prefer their products. Furthermore, the equilibrium condition indicates that level of advertising to the high preference and comparison shopping segment are negatively correlated.
Thus, all else being equal, an increase in the advertising to the high preference segment reduces the advertising to comparison shoppers. Interestingly, with targeted advertising, the equilibrium price is positively correlated to the level of advertising for a Þrm's high preference segment and negatively correlated to the level of advertising for comparison shoppers. This implies that the expected price charged can actually decrease when Þrms are able to target advertising. For example, when advertising is less expensive, the expected price charged by a Þrm decreases with targeted advertising compared to the uniform case. Note that at any cost level k, the advertising level without targeting is less than the advertising level φ s that is observed with targeting. As a result, the proportion of comparison shoppers who consider both products is smaller under uniform advertising than under targeting. Thus targeted advertising endogenously leads to a less differentiated market and lower equilibrium prices. This competitive effect of targeted advertising is likely to be higher when the cost of advertising is lower.
Finally, the greater is the ratio of advertising to the high preference segment versus the comparison shopping segment i.e.
, the higher is the equilibrium price for the Þrm. Overall, this highlights the importance for brand managers to coordinate the pricing strategy not only with the level of total advertising but also with the segment-speciÞc advertising weights employed in a Þrm's media plan.
The targeting of advertising leads to increase in proÞts (as they do in the model of discrete advertising). The effect of targeting advertising is to allow higher levels of advertising with those consumers who actually have the potential to buy the product. In fact, industries where Þrms focus advertising are more proÞtable due to a combination of a) shifting spending from consumers who will never buy to those who will and b) higher optimal spending due to increased impact. Because proÞts are higher with targeting, the equilibrium condition implies that spending on advertising is strictly greater with targeting (recall that proÞts are equal to advertising spending for both the uniform and targeted cases). As discussed earlier, this is different from the discrete case. However, in the discrete case, higher advertising spending with no targeting occurs in cost conditions (inexpensive advertising) that in the continuous case would lead to φ h = 1. Because of the assumption that k > r, this is the case that is not considered above.
In any event, the fundamental effect of targeting in the discrete case is observed in the continuous case as well. Advertising is highest to consumers who prefer the Þrm's product the most. Consistent with Proposition 3, Þrms select the highest advertising for the high preference segment when the reservation price r is offered and this happens precisely when the advertising for comparison shoppers is at its lowest. Conversely, the advertising intensities for each segment are almost equal when the lowest price in the support, p is charged. Interestingly, even the lowest advertising intensity selected for comparison shoppers with targeting is higher than the equilibrium level of advertising without targeting.
Welfare Implications
Consider the case where advertising is uniform in the base model. Total welfare is given by total demand multiplied by the reservation price less the cost of advertising. When A < hr, we follow Lemma 1 and Þrms advertise. Welfare is given by W ua = r − 2A. When A ∈ (hr, hr + sr), advertising is probabilistic. The total demand is 2αh + s(α 2 + 2α(1 − α)) where α is the probability of advertising. Substituting for α * (Proposition 1), we can calculate total demand and each Þrm spends α * A on advertising. Thus, total welfare with uniform advertising is W ua =
The expression W ua exhibits the expected characteristics: it increases in r and decreases in A. When advertising can be targeted and A ∈ (0, hr + sr), we know that Þrms advertise to the high preference consumers with a probability of one and to comparison shoppers with a probability of β
Here, welfare is calculated in the same way but the cost of advertising has two components (the advertising to the h consumers hA and the advertising to comparison shoppers sβA). The total welfare in this situation is
It can be shown that targeted advertising improves welfare. There are three sources of improved welfare. First, targeting allows Þrms to advertise to the high preference segment 100 % of the time. Because r > A, this increases welfare. Second, advertising by each Þrm to the competitor's h segment is eliminated (since this advertising has no effect on demand it is wasted). Finally, the level of advertising directed towards comparison shoppers under targeted advertising by the competing Þrms is the Þrst best level that would be chosen by a central planner.
Conclusion
One of the central questions that Þrms face in advertising and media planning is the manner in which they should focus advertising to speciÞc consumers. How should Þrms allocate their media budgets between consumers who have a distinct preference for their brand and consumers who consider competing products? The paper provides a logic for why Þrms in competitive markets should focus more informative advertising on consumers who have a distinct preference for their products. When Þrms reduce advertising to price elastic consumers who comparison shop they endogenously create additional market differentiation reducing the intensity of competition. The targeting of advertising also provides Þrms with the direct beneÞt of eliminating wasted advertising to consumers who have a distinct preference for the competing product. Due to these reasons, the ability to target advertising increases the equilibrium proÞts of Þrms.
Targeting improves the effectiveness of advertising. By reducing the wastage created by sending advertising to consumers who are unlikely to buy, we might expect improved targeting to lead to lower advertising expenditures. The analysis shows that this conclusion might not always hold.
When advertising is expensive, the inability to target advertising leads Þrms to make low advertising expenditures. In this case, when Þrms can target advertising, advertising spending is higher because the increased effectiveness of advertising makes higher expenditures worthwhile.
An interesting implication of the analysis is that in a competitive environment, the ability to target advertising is more important for increasing Þrm proÞtability than the ability to target pricing. When Þrms have the ability to choose different advertising levels for different groups of consumers, it leads to higher proÞts independent of whether or not Þrms also have the ability to set targeted prices. In contrast, the ability to only target prices creates increased competition for the comparison shoppers.
We can think of two useful extensions to the current model. First, an interesting extension would be to evaluate the effects of targeting when Þrms are asymmetric in terms of the size of their own consumer segments. Second, it would be useful to formally analyze the phenomenon of advertising leakage across segments.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1:
When both Þrms advertise then the guaranteed proÞt of a Þrm is hr−A. This implies that if hr > A, a Þrm will always advertise. When hr ≤ A, a Þrm will not make positive proÞt if it advertises with probability one. This implies that if an equilibrium exists, it has to be one in which Þrms advertise with probability less than one.
Proof of Proposition 1
We look for the symmetric equilibrium of the competition between the two Þrms. Let the probability with which Þrms advertise be α. Then when a Þrm advertises, from (2) the guaranteed proÞt of a
Þrm from charging the reservation price r will be hr + (1 − α)sr − A. Equating this to the proÞts when the Þrm does not advertise we have the equilibrium of α
A possibly totally mixed strategy equilibrium pricing strategy is the following: Each Þrm can charge a price according to some continuous c.d.f F (p) with support between r and some lower bound z. To derive the equilibrium price distribution, substitute α * into (2) to obtain
]. To identify the minimum price in the distribution, note that when a Þrm charges the minimum price we have π(z) = zh + (1 − α)zs + αzs − A = 0. From this the minimum price can be derived to be z = A 1−h after recalling that s = 1 − 2h.
Proof of Proposition 2
Each Þrm can earn a guaranteed of h(r − A) by targeting advertising only to its high preference segment and charging the reservation price. The proÞt to a Þrm while also advertising to the comparison shopping segment with probability β is given by (3) in the text. By considering the proÞt when a Þrm is also advertising to the comparison shopping segment and charging the reservation price and equating this to the guaranteed proÞt when not advertising to the comparison shoppers, we have the equilibrium condition
From this the equilibrium probability of advertising to the comparison shoppers can be derived to be β
. Given this the equilibrium price distribution can be easily derived by using a procedure which is similar to the one shown for Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
It follows directly from comparing the total advertising in Proposition 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
When A < hr, Þrm proÞts are hr − A when advertising is uniform and h(r − A) with targeted advertising. V ta = π ta − π ua = A(1 − h). When A > hr, Þrms proÞts are zero with uniform advertising and h(r − A) with targeted advertising. Hence V ta = h(r − A).
Continuous Advertising
We Þrst provide the analysis of uniform advertising for the continuous case. The proÞt function for a Þrm is:
The Þrst order condition for advertising implies that
Multiply both sides by φ and substituting back into the objective function we get π(p) = kφ 2 2 for all the prices in the equilibrium support. From the invariance of proÞt in the mixed strategy price equilibrium, the equilibrium proÞt is a constant for every price in the equilibrium support and hence Þrms use pure advertising strategies. Therefore, φ o (p o ) = φ (a constant) in the symmetric equilibrium.
To derive the equilibrium value of φ, note that when charging the reservation price r, the equilibrium condition is r(h + s(1 − φ)) = kφ from which we obtain: φ = r(h+s) k+rs
. For an internal solution, we require that k > hr (this corresponds to the condition that A > hr in the discrete case). As a result, the equilibrium proÞt is π = 2 . Substituting the expression for φ into the Þrst order condition, we obtain:
The minimum price in the support can be easily identiÞed as p = 
Targeted Advertising and Uniform Pricing
The Þrst order condition for φ h is:
The Þrst order condition for φ s is:
This implies that
We now substitute for p and p
into the objective function in the main text to obtain the following expression:
Because of the discrete nature of the market, the pricing equilibrium is in mixed strategies. Since p = kφ h (as implied by the Þrst order condition for φ h ), φ h must also be a mixed strategy. Then equation iii implies that advertising to comparison shoppers is also a mixed advertising strategy.
In addition, because p = kφ h ⇒ φ h = p k therefore k > r is a necessary condition for an "internal solution" because r is the highest price observed in a mixed pricing strategy. This is more restrictive than the condition on k in the no targeting case. (Values of k < r imply that the upper range of the price support is associated with a corner solution in advertising of φ h = 1). Accordingly, we can focus on the parameter combinations where k > r.
Proof of Proposition 6 Note that (1 − F (p)) + R p p (1 − φ o (p o ))f (p o )dp is the fraction of comparison shoppers that a Þrm will acquire at price p and this is clearly less than 1. As a result, the Þrst order conditions shown above imply that φ h (p) > φ s (p) for all p. Similar to the discrete case, advertising to the high preference segment is always higher than advertising to comparison shoppers. In addition, equation iii implies that φ h (p) and φ s (p) are negatively correlated. This proves the Þrst part of − As before W ta = Dr − C A . Since D = 2h + 2β − β 2 − 4hβ + 2hβ 2 , therefore: . This is a downward facing parabola in A with the following roots.
In order for W ta − W ua < 0, we need either A 1 > hr or A 2 < (h + s)r. For A 1 > hr, we need which is outside the allowable range for h. Similarly, for A 2 < (h + s)r, we need . Thus a central planner would advertise at each Þrm with the same probability that is chosen competitively.
